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During 2014, Yemen observers suspected former President Ali Abdullah Saleh of
facilitating, if not orchestrating, the Houthi military expansion into the Governorates of
Amran and Sana’a.  At that time, Saleh and his loyalists at the General People Congress
(GPC) were leading a counterrevolution against President Abdrahbu Mansour Hadi and his
backers from the Islah party (Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood), who had spearheaded the
“Arab Spring” uprising of 2011. On July 8, 2014, the battle-hardened Houthi fighters, locally
known as the Popular Committees (PCs), seized control of the city of Amran, the
northwestern gateway into the capital Sana'a. By the evening of September 21, the PCs
had captured the Sana'a City Municipality. Although the Houthi-Saleh alliance was implicit
at first, it was formalized in early August with the formation of the Supreme Political
Council (SPC). The anti-Hadi coup had achieved its goal.
Deeply Rooted Conflict 
Between 2004 and 2010, Saleh’s government waged six brutal military campaigns, known
as the Sa’da wars, against the Houthis. At that time, the Houthi movement was comprised
of a relatively small militia based in the northern governorate of Sa’da. The Houthis are a
Zaydi revivalist movement, an offshoot of Shi’ite Islam, but closely associated with the
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Sunni branch of Islam. 
Although it may be easier to classify the Houthis as Shi’ites, especially since they have
recently started embracing Twelver Shi’ite practices, such a label is technically inaccurate.
Retired Colonel Patrick Lang, who served as the U.S. defense attaché in the American
embassy in Sana's in the early 1980s, argues:
“There does not exist a natural affinity between the Yemeni Zaidis and the 12er [i.e.
follower of the 12th imam] Shi’ite of southern Iraq and Iran. The Zaidiya follows a system of
religious law that more closely resembles that of the Hanafi Sunni "school" of law than that
of the Shi’ite of Iran or Iraq. The Zaidi scholars profess no allegiance to the 12er Shi’ite
scholarship of the Iranian teachers... ”.
The Houthis harbored numerous grievances with the central government, including, but not
limited to, the underdevelopment of their region, increasing cooperation with the U.S. in the
post 9/11 era, and the perceived encroachment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-backed
Wahhabi (ultra-conservative Salafi) doctrine into the Zaydi heartland. When the pro-Saleh
military and tribal forces attempted to arrest Hussein al-Houthi (the founding father of the
Houthi movement, officially named Ansar Allah or Supporters of God), fighting broke out,
leading to al-Houthi’s execution and sparking a six-year armed conflict with the Saleh
regime.
While ostensibly leading the military campaign against the Houthis, Saleh made a point of
deploying mainly units led by Major General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar, a veteran general
and an influential tribal figure dubbed as the second strongest man in Yemen. Reportedly,
General al-Ahmar was the biggest obstacle to Saleh's plan to hand over the presidency to
his eldest son, Ahmed. 
Saleh’s plan aimed at hitting two birds with one stone. On one hand, the protracted military
campaigns depleted al-Ahmar’s forces and led to tribal blood libels with the tribes of the
northern highlands. The battle plans also preserved the better-equipped and well-trained
Republican Guard brigades under the command of Brigadier General Ahmed Ali, Saleh’s
son and heir. It has been widely reported that every time the military was close to encircling
the Houthis, Saleh would order the military to cease-fire and retreat. Other reports,
however, confirmed that while fighting the Houthis, Saleh was also arming them. Supplying
both sides with weapons to both neutralize and deplete the enemies’ forces was one of the
former Yemeni president’s favorite tactics.
Saudi Arabia joined the fighting in 2009, helping Saleh by bombing Houthi positions. In one
of the more intriguing episodes of the combat, Saleh’s regime, which provided the Saudi Air
Force with the coordinates of bombing targets, provided them with the location of Ali
Mohsen's headquarters, claiming it was a Houthi headquarters. Sensing something was off
with the location of the target, Saudi Air Force pilots aborted the mission, double checked
the coordinates and discovered that they had almost unwittingly assassinated one of their
close allies in Yemen. Despite their support, the Saudis have always been deeply
suspicious of Saleh’s motives and this incident reinforced that belief.
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In early 2010, both sides signed a cease-fire, ending a conflict that had resulted in
thousands of deaths and tens of thousands of internally displaced people. In addition to the
human and financial toll, the government, in effect, ceded control of Saada and the
surrounding areas to the Houthis and their tribal allies. The following year, as the “Arab
Spring” spread throughout the Middle East, the Houthis joined the protests, demanding
Saleh's resignation. 
After being driven out of power in 2012, Saleh maintained a vast network of tribal, military,
and bureaucratic allies, cultivated throughout his three decades in power. During the
following couple of years, he would undermine his successor, President Hadi, aided by the
latter’s ineffectiveness. More importantly, Saleh would build an alliance with the Houthis
and use his military and tribal networks to exact revenge on those whom he felt had
betrayed him. Among them were the Houthis' mortal enemies - Ali Mohsen of the Islah
Party and the Al-Ahmar family (not related to Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar), then the strongest
tribal family in the country. 
The Houthis were gaining strength and expanding beyond their region for the first time.
They took advantage of the government's state of paralysis and, aided by Saleh, who
instructed his loyalists to stand down and let the Houthis roll through, they eventually took
the capital with little resistance.
Since the takeover of Sana'a and the state institutions during the fall of 2014, several
developments have occurred. President Hadi was placed under house arrest and when he
managed to escape and flee to Aden, Houthi and Saleh forces rolled south, taking over
provinces on the way until they reached Aden. With President Hadi facing the prospect of
fleeing the country, Saudi Arabia launched a military campaign, ostensibly to support
Yemen’s “legitimate” government and prevent the complete takeover of the country.
Operation Decisive Storm, launched on March 26th, 2015, shocked observers, perhaps
none more than Saleh and the Houthis, who did not expect Saudi Arabia to intervene
militarily in the country. This intervention would bring Saleh and the Houthis even closer as
they faced a common military threat, despite their history of hostility.
Tensions Flaring
Almost ten months have passed since the formal political agreement between the GPC and
the Houthis that resulted in the creation of the SPC. Under the new political agreement, the
constitutional declaration announced in February 2015 by the Houthi-backed Supreme
Revolutionary Committee (SRC) - the de facto ruling body ever since President Hadi fled to
Aden – would be nullified. The new agreement would restore the state's institutions by
evacuating all stationed SRC “supervisors”. Additionally, the SPC agreement specified that
both sides (Houthis and GPC) would alternate the presidency of the SPC every four
months. The facts on the ground have differed with the SRC supervisors still exercising
power, and the Houthis refusing to relinquish their hold on the SPC’s presidency. The
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shortcomings of the SPC agreement have been a source of constant frustration to Saleh
and his political allies. 
On November 28, 2016, both sides announced the formation of a National Salvation
Government which failed to garner international recognition, even from the Houthis’ primary
regional ally, Iran. It is worth noting that prior to the formation of the government, the GPC
had been holding back on joining a “post-Hadi” government due to the Houthis’ refusal to
implement the conditions of the SPC agreement signed between them. The agreement
entailed the withdrawal of their PCs and SRC supervisors from the ministries and
institutions of the state. However, internal considerations (GPC base) and perhaps the
failure of the UN talks forced Saleh to agree with the condition that the Houthis would fulfill
their previous commitments, something they have not done so far. 
The SRC continues to harass Saleh allies through lawsuits, physical threats, and assault, in
addition to the methodical exclusion of long-term bureaucrats and officials associated with
Saleh from both government and security services. Several GPC ministers have
complained of physical harassment by the PCs or their deputies (Houthi appointees), with
several of them refusing to go back to work under the current situation. At the same time,
the Houthis have been appointing their supporters, many of whom lack any experience, to
positions of influence.
Another source of contention has been the Houthis' systematic changes to the education
curriculum of the country, with an emphasis on sectarian ideologies that until recently were
alien to Yemeni society. As for the state media, the Houthis, through their Minister of
Information, are conspicuously ignoring any news or speeches by Saleh or the GPC
ministers while giving extensive coverage to their leader and ministers.
The Future of the Houthi-Saleh Alliance
The Houthis' actions display an obvious lack of political experience and trust in Saleh, who,
in return, mistrusts the Houthis. This mutual suspicion will probably lead to an abrupt end to
the alliance as soon as the war is over, if not sooner. The alliance has not been ideological;
it is, rather, a temporary marriage of convenience created to face the challenge of the
Saudi-led war.
How the marriage ends depends on who manages to strike a deal with Saudi Arabia. Each
side has an interest in maintaining its unity, but also realizes that its long-term survival and
legitimacy might hinge on abandoning its current partner. While viewed by officials in
Riyadh as an Iranian proxy, the Houthis benefit from the fact that thus far the Saudis have
refused to work with Saleh, whom the Saudis view as ungrateful and duplicitous. Despite
treating him following the attempt on his life and having funneled billions of dollars into his
government over the years, Saleh has handed the country over to a group that has links to
their mortal enemy, Iran. On the other hand, the Saudis’ view of the Houthis has matured,
and they recognize that they are a force on the ground that will be part of Yemen’s long-
term solution, as evident by the frequent meetings in Dhahran Aljanoub between
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Mohammed Abdulsalam, the Houthis spokesperson, and members of the Saudi national
security apparatus. 
There have been many recent armed skirmishes between Saleh and the Houthis that have
threatened to escalate the war into a full-blown military confrontation between both sides.
Each time, Saleh has worked on de-escalating, knowing full well that any dispute would
currently harm him more than it would the Houthis. That being said, and despite the friction,
the military alliance seems relatively cohesive due to a shared sense of danger. Yet,
reports indicate that the majority of the fighting is being conducted by Saleh's Republican
Guards, while the Houthis seem more preoccupied with maintaining influence on population
centers. 
Former President Saleh remains popular throughout the country, as illustrated by his
presence in the large protest held recently in Sana'a. He is aided by his vast tribal alliances
and his ideological moderation, and his supporters are regionally and culturally diverse. The
Houthis understand that Saleh and his allies maintain control and influence, in theory, over
official state institutions such as the parliament and the Sana’a-based ministries. The SPC
and the NSG do not have any constitutional or legal legitimacy or international recognition,
and this factor might push the Houthis to break the alliance if challenged by the GPC. Just
as the Houthis will be part of any future settlement in Yemen, so will Saleh’s GPC. Although
it is clear that Saleh himself will not be part of any settlement, a combination of incentives
and threats will be needed for him to end his spoiler role. Unfreezing his assets, removing
the travel ban, and retaining a political future for his son could alter Saleh’s behavior. 
Two years after the launch of the Saudi-led military coalition to restore president Hadi and
curtail Houthi military expansion, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the leader of Ansar Allah, called for
a “state of emergency” to “purge state institutions from traitors” and to “redirect all
government resources to the war efforts”. Such a one-sided declaration following the
formation of the SPC and the GPC-Houthi NSG can widen the gap between the Houthis
and Saleh. 
Although the Saleh and Houthi alliance has withstood a two-year conflict, the depletion of
resources, international pressure, and loss of territory, the cracks in their alliance are as
large as ever. Both sides have openly criticized each other, especially throughout recent
weeks, pointing to an alliance that is crumbling. That said, there are still no signs that any
party in the ongoing conflict is willing to abdicate or yield.
This article was originally published by Gulf State Analytics on May 10, 2017.
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